The European Union appears to be promoting at the same time both cross-national 
INTRODUCTION
This article explores the interaction between two areas of intervention of the European Union (EU) namely the free movement of workers and occupational pensions. The former is a well-known (and developed) area of EU law, forming one of the fundamental pillars upon which the European construction has been built. The latter area has been growing in importance particularly over the * Dr Marion Del Sol is Professor of Law at the University of Rennes 1 (France). Address: Faculté de droit et de science politique 9, rue Jean Macé 35042 Rennes cédex, France; email: marion.del-sol@univ-rennes1.fr 2 last twenty years, although this has mainly been due to its 'financial' aspects.
1 As we show in this Introduction, different policies of the EU are now explicitly aimed at increasing both mobility and the use of occupational pensions. We argue, however, that promoting both workers' mobility and the use of occupational pensions necessarily engenders a tension that the EU has only recently started to address.
The aim of this article is to explore this tension. By comparing the case law of the Court of Justice on free movement of workers with the (relatively) recent Directive 2014/50 on the minimum requirements for enhancing worker mobility between Member States by improving the acquisition and preservation of supplementary pension rights, we highlight the different protections offered by these two sets of instruments. In doing so we also consider the potential for a mutually reinforcing dialogue (or for a conflict) between the two. Furthermore, we assess the kind of 'mobility' implicitly envisaged by the present state of EU law, which appears to provide incentives only to certain kind of international mobility.
In this article, we refer to concepts, such as 'waiting period' 2 and 'vesting period' 3 , which are relevant for the specific issue of the interaction between workers' mobility and occupational 
3
The article is structured as follows. In the rest of this Introduction we present the two potentially conflicting aims pursued by the EU, namely promoting workers' mobility and occupational pensions. In Section 2 we provide a brief account of Directive 2014/50, which also covers the protracted negotiations which ultimately led to its adoption. Section 3 deals with the interaction between the case law of the Court of Justice on free movement of workers (including the situation of frontier workers) and occupational pensions. We also look to the role of multinational companies and pan-European pension schemes in underpinning workers' mobility. In Section 4
we draw some conclusions on the different pathways to marrying workers' mobility and occupational pensions which emerge from the encounters between EU legislation and the case law of the Court of Justice.
The EU and Occupational Pensions
The competencies of the European Union in the field of social protection are, as is well known, quite limited. 6 The EU cannot directly act in order to harmonise national retirement systems. That being said, demographic as well as economic considerations have brought to the fore the objective of promoting the convergence of these national systems. 7 This process of convergence, mainly carried out through the Open Method of Coordination, 8 sees occupational pensions as a fundamental piece of the puzzle. Thus, these 2 nd pillar pensions have been made the object of specific attention from EU institutions, aimed at increasing their importance -although their importance varies widely from one Member State to the other. This has been mainly achieved through competences devoted to the internal market, by, for instance, providing the framework for the management of these instruments in transnational situations (on the basis of the freedom to provide services) 9 as well as by ensuring the protection of the rights of the affiliated. Cornilleau, Sterdyniak and Math (2007) .
9
For a political science analysis, see Coron (2003) . 10 See Muller (2008) .
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EU has, so far, mainly understood the phenomenon of occupational pensions through the institutions in charge of their management.
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The diversity of occupational pensions regimes and their uneven presence across Member States, clearly represents a challenge for the intra-European mobility of workers. Indeed, the choice of moving from one Member State to another to take up work for the acquisition and preservation of pension rights in the context of an occupational pension regime is by no means neutral. The issue then turns into one of the free movement of workers.
Free movement of workers
Free movement of workers has been one of the fundamental pillars of the European integration since its very beginning. Although the provision guaranteeing this right has been dubbed the 'Cinderella provision', 12 with respect to the other fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaties, one cannot overlook its importance both in economic and social terms. Indeed, both the The lack of sufficient labour mobility has been identified as one of the weaknesses of the Eurozone, depriving the countries that have adopted the Euro of yet another tool to respond to asymmetric (economic) shocks. 23 Seen from this perspective, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Directive on supplementary pension rights 24 was finally adopted during a period of economic crisis and widespread (and asymmetric) unemployment. 25 In another rather cliché development, case law preceded the adoption of a legislative instrument. 26 On this occasion, the Opinion of A.G. Kokott warned against the obstacle to workers' mobility created by the unfavourable treatment of occupational pension rights. 27 We will come back to this decision in Section 3.
THE PORTABILITY DIRECTIVE THAT WASN'T
The first proposal for a portability directive in the field of occupational pensions was tabled by the Canetta, Fries-Tersch and Mabilia (2014: 6) . 23 See for instance Krugman (2012) referring to the seminal paper by Mundell (1961 The proposal introduced by the Commission in 2005 aimed at addressing the shortcomings of this situation. Concerning acquisition, the proposal provided that the minimum age (for joining a scheme and/or for acquiring pension rights) should not be higher than 21, with a maximum waiting period of one year and a maximum vesting period of two years. 38 The proposal was particularly ambitious on transferability, by providing for the possibility for the worker to transfer their acquired rights to another scheme. 39 Providers were also obliged to reimburse the contributions of 29 Guardiancich (2015b: 87) .
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Three contributions, written at the three different stages of these negotiations provide a comprehensive picture of the process: Kalogeropoulou (2006 The 2007 proposal 41 marks the shift from portability to minimum requirements. Hence, the issues related to transferability were not addressed. The possibility of reimbursement was also narrowed. 42 On acquisition, the amended proposal maintained the maximum waiting period of one year and the minimum age of 21. Vesting periods based on the worker's age were differentiated:
a maximum of one year for those over 25 years, and a maximum five years for the others. Finally, dormant rights received specific attention. These should be treated 'fairly', with the proposed Directive providing a series of examples of fair treatment. 43
The compromise
The text ultimately adopted following the new proposal of 2013 continued along the path of diminishing ambitions. On the issue of acquisition, the Directive is relatively similar to its previous version, confirming the minimum age of 21 plus a combined total duration of waiting and vesting periods of three years. 44 Concerning preservation of acquired rights and reimbursement rules, the Directive did not change much of the previous 2007 version. 45 Importantly, the Directive is not retroactive, thus applying only to contributions and pension rights acquired after its implementation.
At Ibidem, Articles 4(1)(c) and 5.
8 transfer for unfunded schemes, the proposals would have entailed the risk of a unidirectional flow of capital away from the countries characterised by funded schemes. 46 The question of the cost of portability also played a role in the opposition to the proposal. 47 Beyond the actual content summarised above, a further element differentiates the proposals. This is the choice of the legal basis operated by the Commission, an element which is potentially relevant in the context of the present article. So, with the final (2013) proposal, the legal basis was changed from Article 48 TFEU, dealing with the coordination of social security, to Article 46 which, in conjunction with Article 45, covers the broader scope of free movement of workers.
As highlighted by O'Leary 48 (writing about the coordination of social security) there is a potential tension between rights and principles stemming from the Treaties and the detailed secondary legislation adopted to implement these same rights. This issue is explored in Section 3.
A limited right to information
A more specific (but fundamental) topic in the field of occupational pensions is that of information for affiliated workers. 49 Once again, different regimes across Europe are characterised by considerable diversity in terms of the forms that this information might take. 50 As such, it is not surprising that Directive 2014/50 only devotes one Article to the information for both active and dormant members. 51 Reflecting Recital 25 of the Directive, the closing paragraph of Article 6
states that: 'The obligations under this Article shall be without prejudice to and shall be in addition to the obligations of the institutions for occupational retirement provision under Article 11 of 46 Pension providers from The Netherlands were particularly concerned by this risk, so much so that the Dutch government actually threatened to veto the proposal. See Mabbett (2009: 787 One should not forget that, beyond the differences between Member States, a number of different methods for the provision of information can co-exist in the same Member State.
51
The Article also deals with the provision of information in the case of survivor's benefits, which we will not cover.
Directive 2003/41/EC'. 52 Thus, an intertextual reading of the instruments is necessary in order to obtain the whole picture of information rights.
As In the case of a defined benefits (DB) scheme, the information about the projected level which should be attained by the benefits. In the case of defined contributions (DC) schemes information covers eventual options of allocation (together with a description of risks and costs associated with every option). 54 '
Workers whose current employment relationship entitles them or is likely to entitle them, after fulfilling any acquisition conditions, to a supplementary pension in accordance with the provisions of a supplementary pension scheme', Article 3(c) of Directive 2014/50.
55
The Article also provides that '[w] here the scheme allows early access to vested pension rights through the payment of a capital sum, the information provided shall also include a written statement that the member should consider taking advice on investing that capital sum for retirement provision'. It is also worth highlighting the absence of precision concerning the subject of the obligation of providing the information. Member States are themselves called to ensure that the information can actually be obtained. Each transposition will then have to adapt to the specific national situation in identifying the entity concerned.
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This choice mirrors the one adopted in the IORP Directive, Article 11(4). used instead'. 60 The extent of 'reasonable' delay for the provision of information is also left undecided, allowing Member States to set a ceiling (once a year) for the provision of information.
Thus, while the actual content of the information is adapted to the needs of the mobile worker, the method for delivering this information remains far from satisfactory. 61 The necessity of a specific request clearly clashes with the complexity of pension regimes and with the potential impact of the mobility itself (hence, the cessation of employment) on pension rights. In light of this, it is only on request that the given worker will obtain the necessary information to assess such an impact.
Directive 2014/50 seems, therefore, to depict the profile of a worker who is already aware of the importance of considering the impact of mobility on his or her pension rights. Highly mobile workers engaged in international careers are probably those who stand to profit from this Directive, insofar as they are already used to assessing the pros and cons of every mobility decision.
Moreover, these same workers should prima facie be able to profit from the information covered by the requirements set by the Directive, by exercising individual choices to compensate eventual shortfalls caused by the treatment, for instance, of dormant rights. All in all, the information requirements set by Directive 2014/50 seem to point to a rather 'golden' (or 'high-skilled') kind of mobility.
WORKERS' MOBILITY, OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS AND THE COURT
In looking at the legal basis of Directive 2014/50, we argue that the Court of Justice is not bound to consider the free movement of workers as sufficiently guaranteed by the provisions of the Directive. The CJEU has sometimes provided an interpretation of secondary legislation heavily inspired by the legal basis of such legislation. 62 Moreover, secondary legislation is always subject to a 'constitutionally oriented' interpretation in light of primary law, which can sometimes border 60 The recast proposal is in fact extremely precise. It specifies that information shall be 'presented in a way that is easy to read, using characters of readable size'.
61
Member Statas are, however, free to adopt or maintain more favourable provisions dealing with the right to information. The Directive also feature a non-regression clause which states that the transposition the Directive shall not be used as a reason for reducing existing rights (including rights to information).
12 on the contra legem. 63 This is even more relevant in the context of the free movement of workers since it has been repeatedly found to have direct effect both in vertical and horizontal situations. 64 The Court of Justice has developed its case law on the basis of situations where workers' mobility had an impact, whether direct or indirect, on his or her occupational pension. Some of these decisions arose in connection with the situation of a frontier worker, which is particularly relevant both in terms of the number of workers potentially concerned and for its connection with fiscal issues.
Frontier workers
Frontier workers 65 represent a specific case of intra-European mobility. Their situation has important implications both in terms of social security and fiscal considerations. Frontier workers are, in fact, subject to the fiscal regime of the Member State in which they reside. This can have an impact on retirement schemes that take into account the fiscal situation of the workers, amounting to an indirect discrimination. The Court of Justice has been confronted with these kinds of situations, which have been decided on the basis of rules dealing with workers' mobility in the EU. 66 In Commission v Germany (2009) 67 the Court had to consider the German Riester legislation. More specifically, it had to decide on the incentives to instruments for private pensions, as well as for the acquisition of a house. These incentives were, however, limited to persons who were completely covered by the German fiscal system. Such a condition had the effect of excluding frontier workers working in Germany but residing in a neighbouring Member State. 
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found these measures to be in breach of the free movement of workers enshrined in the EU Treaties, as 'mobile' workers were treated less favourably on the basis of their mobility. 68 This followed the approach proposed by the Commission in the infringement procedure. 69 Moreover, the Court condemned the German law as it denied 'cross-border workers the right to use the subsidised capital for the acquisition or construction of an owner-occupied dwelling unless it was situated in Germany', 70 in light of the fact that frontier workers would be more frequently interested in acquiring such a property in the Member State of their residence.
This decision provides a few interesting points for analysis. First, fiscal incentives for complementary retirement regimes cannot ignore the situation of the specific worker, in particular the effects stemming from the worker's mobility. Fiscal incentives must therefore be considered together with the eventual awarding of social advantages. 71 Second, as we saw before, the action of the EU Commission can have an important impact on occupational pensions through indirect avenues. Thus, the mobility of frontier workers warrants the scrutiny of the Commission because of its transnational aspect, a scrutiny which then expands to fiscal measures.
In fact, the situation of frontier workers is also specific in that they might well spend their entire career in a situation of 'mobility' without further changing Member States. As such, conditions for the acquisition of pension rights in the country in which they carry out their work is of paramount importance for their future retirement. At the same time, frontier workers are most likely to receive their pension in a transnational situation, which again brings under the spotlight the conditions for the (transnational) payment of retirement benefits.
A second important decision must be mentioned in this context, notably the 75 Hence, collective agreements (whether at company or sectoral level) establishing occupational retirement plans must take into account the situation of mobile workers in general, and frontier workers in particular, in order to avoid treating them in a less favourable way.
A combined reading of these decisions is necessary. The conclusion is that the Court of Justice clearly approaches workers' mobility in the field of occupational pensions by applying the principles of non-discrimination and of equal treatment of mobile workers, considering their social and fiscal aspects. However, one should keep in mind that both decisions dealt with frontier workers, whose situation remains specific, especially from the point of view of fiscal rules.
Free movement of workers and the Casteels case
Turning to the broader topic of workers' mobility, the decision delivered by the Court of Justice in the Casteels case represents the necessary starting point for our analysis. 76
Mr. Casteels worked for British Airways since 1974, moving between different countries during his career (notably Belgium, France, Germany, and Belgium once again). At the point of retirement, British Airways refused 77 to take into account, for the purposes of awarding Mr.
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Erny, para. 14. Ibidem, para. 52.
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For a more detailed analysis, see Bollen-Vanderboorn and Stevens (2012) .
77
A stance eliciting per se some bewilderment from the Commentators, see Ellison (2012) .
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Casteels the pension benefits that stemmed from the company's supplementary pension, the time during which he had been working in Germany. This was on the basis that the period of employment in Germany (slightly less than 3 years) was short of the vesting period. 78 For this period, Mr. Casteels would only be able to claim the reimbursement of his own contributions. The Labour Court of Brussels, which had to decide on the action brought by Mr. Casteels, stayed the proceedings and asked whether the decision of British Airways (and the underlying collective agreement upon which the employer's decision was based) was compatible with Articles 39 and 42 EC (now Articles 45 and 48 TFEU).
The Court of Justice did not consider the issue from the point of view of Article 48 TFEU, finding that this Article could not be given direct effect because of its lack of precision as to the extent of the content of the protection. 79 Instead, it analysed the case exclusively from the point of view of the free movement of workers (Article 45 TFEU).
The Court hence assessed the application of the vesting period provided by the German collective agreement through its standard approach of restriction/justification.
The measure was found to be a restriction to the free movement of workers. This was on the basis of the case law covering non-discriminatory restrictions. 80 The existence of such a restriction was also confirmed by the 'financial losses' as well as by the 'adverse effect on [the mobile workers'] supplementary pension rights' stemming from the application of the vesting period. 81 The Court then went on to look for a justification for such a restriction. In this process, the objective of retaining staff loyalty put forward by British Airways was discarded, as Mr. Casteels had in fact been employed by the same employer after exercising his right to free movement. 82 The decision of the Court was thus that the years of service completed in Germany by Mr. Casteels had to be included in calculating the benefits of his supplementary pension.
78
Casteels, paras 6-10.
79
Casteels, paras 14-18.
80
'Article 45 TFEU militates against any measure which, even though applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, is capable of hindering or rendering less attractive the exercise by European Union nationals of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty', ibidem, para 22 and cited case law.
81
Ibidem, para 29.
82
Ibidem, para 32.
83
Ibidem, para 36.
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The obvious question stemming from this decision deals with its applicability beyond the specificities of Mr. Casteels' situation. 84 . This is particularly relevant for two different sets of reasons. The first one is rather evident: Directive 2014/50 is relatively recent and not retroactive, hence leaving all past claims to be resolved on the basis of the provisions of free movement of workers. Second, as we saw above, the same Directive does not cover several areas of potential litigation (transferability and cross-border membership, for instance) and leaves in place other possible obstacles to free movement (such as waiting and vesting periods of up to 3 years).
The applicability to a broader set of situations stems from several elements of the decision. In the first place, the fact that the Court reached its verdict on the basis of primary law, so that a contested measure just needed to be liable to hinder free movement of workers (even in a non-discriminatory way) to be scrutinised. Moreover, the measure whose application sparked the Casteels case is a rather common one, namely a vesting period. Such measures are in fact still allowed 85 under the new Directive. It is also worth stressing that, in the context of first pillar pensions, the Court has considered that the simple loss of part of an individual's pension rights can hinder the free movement of workers. 86 Thus, once the breach (hence, the restriction) has been identified, its justification might prove relatively complicated. This is because the Court of Justice consistently refuses justifications based on economic arguments. 87 Hence, justifications based on the costs of allowing (for instance) aggregation of periods and/or transfer of contributions would not be accepted by the Court of Justice.
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind the elements which militate in favour of a narrow reading of Casteels.
The first important element comes straight from the wording of the decision. The CJEU explicitly refers to 'the years of service completed by a worker for the same employer in establishments of 84 Baugniet, note 33 above: 307 and ff. has thoroughly analysed several hypothetical scenarios in his doctoral dissertation.
85
See the summary of Directive 2014/50 above. Thanks also to the persuasive power of its democratic imprimatur, as highlighted by Kilpatrick (2012: 7) .
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plus waiting' period allowed by the said Directive could indeed be presumed as 'too uncertain and indirect' under Graf.
3.3
The concentration road to portability?
It has been argued that Directive 2014/50 does not offer much added value with respect to the case law of the CJEU, and specifically with respect to the Casteels decision. 99 This should be nuanced in light of the multiple roles that legislative intervention can play even while codifying the already existing case law 100 in terms of providing structure, detail, certainty, adaptation and consolidation.
That said, it remains rather striking to notice that the protection granted by Casteels to mobile workers goes, to some extent, beyond that of Directive 2014/50, as analysed above.
Apart from the issues addressed in the previous Section, it is worth highlighting a second question arising from this situation. In doing so we leave aside for a moment the applicability of Casteels in a broader set of situations in order to focus on the wording of the decision.
On this basis one might argue that, in order to enjoy the right to free movement to its full extent, a worker should work for a multinational company. Indeed, going much beyond the minimum rights protected by the Directive (which was not applicable ratione temporis) Mr. 
CONCLUSIONS
A Directive establishing minimum requirements -as opposed to one providing for portabilityseems to represent the most advanced compromise possible at European level at this time. Also, the ambition of the EU to act in the field of occupational pensions on the basis of a 'social' rationale seems very limited. However, the consequences of workers' mobility on occupational pensions are very real. Both the Directive, lack of ambition notwithstanding, and the case law of the Court of Justice are proof of this situation.
In conclusion, we wish to highlight three main points that are worth keeping in mind when looking at the future of the EU legal framework for occupational pensions.
First of all, observers and stakeholders should keep an eye on the discrepancies (and hence, the potential conflict) between Directive 2014/50 and the case law of the Court of Justice, embodied in the Casteels decision. On the one hand, the new piece of legislation might have a dampening effect on the application of free movement provisions in the field of occupational pensions.
Essentially, the Directive would become the yardstick upon which to measure the compatibility with the Treaties. This kind of dynamic already exists in the field of occupational pensions, with legislative intervention to exclude non-statutory scheme from the coordination regime set up for social security, 107 an approach promptly upheld by the Court.
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On the other hand, the CJEU might still be called to decide on one of the areas left outside the scope of Directive 2014/50, such as waiting/vesting periods of less than three years or a request for the cross-border transfer of the value of vested rights. A Barber-like moment, 108 with the CJEU delivering a ground-breaking decision on one of these aspects on the basis of the free movement of workers might rekindle the ambitions of the European legislator. This mutually reinforcing loop between negative and positive integration would confirm a recurring characteristic of the evolution of EU integration. 109 Moreover, the exclusion of retroactivity for Directive 2014/50 (another necessary compromise on the way to its adoption) will leave the door open for further litigation to be decided exclusively on the basis of primary law provisions for many years to come. Hence, the case law of the CJEU on topic here at stake might yet feed on this exclusion, with potentially far reaching economic implications for both workers and pension providers.
Our second point stems from the first scenario sketched above, that is, from the scenario where Directive 2014/50 effectively represents the framework for the issue at stake. The decision in Casteels would thus be interpreted as a narrow exception to this regime, on the basis, we argue, of the identity of the employer. Such a scenario would provide an incentive for highly mobile workers to be employed by multinational companies, in order to enjoy the full extent of mobility in the field of their occupational pensions. This could be coupled with the creation of pan-European schemes, allowing mobility for workers moving between different employers (established in different Member States) affiliated to the same scheme. Such an 'integration through concentration' would hence sidestep the difficulties of finding a compromise at EU level that were painfully highlighted by the history of Directive 2014/50. Apart from the uncertainty of such a dynamic, made apparent by some answers to the EIOPA consultation mentioned above, 110 this would entail another pernicious effect in the form of job lock. An employee enjoying (close to) full portability thanks to the fact of being employed by the same multinational employer or of being employed by employers contributing to the same pan-European scheme would find it extremely costly to move away from such a situation. 
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The present configuration of the legislation -and this is our final point -also (implicitly) proposes a rather specific 'profile' of a mobile worker. In particular, the Directive seems more likely to offer useful instruments to safeguard pension rights of 'engaged members', i.e. highly-mobile and highly-skilled workers, as we highlighted while dealing with the provision of information in Section 2.2. In this sense, it is remarkable that just a year after the adoption of the Directive, EIOPA has identified the automatic delivery of information as 'good practice' on individual transfers, 111 whereas the Directive only requires provision of information on request of the leaving member.
All in all, though the Directive represents a step forward in terms of minimum harmonisation in the field of occupational pensions, 112 its role in promoting workers' mobility in the EU will probably be very limited.
